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Not There Yet - Spain’s Security Strategy from a Human 
Security Perspective 
Gemma Collantes-Celador1 
Introduction 
The much-awaited Spanish Security Strategy (the Security Strategy hereinafter) became 
a reality in June 2011. It has been described by some as a major leap forward in Spain’s 
strategic thinking and planning, and by others as a crucial moment in the history of 
Spanish democracy (IEEE 2011: 1; Estella et al. 2010: 3). Undoubtedly, it is a 
confirmation of Spain’s determination to develop into a strategic partner in the 
provision of stability and peace in an ever-growing, complex and interdependent 
international security scenario. The Security Strategy is based on a broad understanding 
of security and on a diverse range of actors and issues interacting to formulate a 
common security vision fit for the twenty-first century. In particular, the frequent 
references in the document to a ‘comprehensive approach’, ‘effective multilateralism’, 
‘responsible interdependence’, as well as the idea that security is ‘everyone’s 
responsibility’, are examples of the penetration of the human security discourse into 
Spanish security thinking. Indeed, these concepts and themes share much with key 
principles in A Human Security Doctrine for Europe proposed by the Human Security 
Study Group (HSSG 2004). Some of these concepts and themes have in past years 
already been translated into policies and actions. Examples include Spain’s active 
participation in, and support of, initiatives on gender issues, its adherence to 
international legal mechanisms and its commitment to the UN. The argument developed 
in this chapter will ultimately show that, despite this positive progress, human security 
principles have not yet become the ‘operating framework’ (HSSG 2007: 7) in Spain’s 
security thinking and practices. National security discourses do persist, reinforced by a 
range of political, economic and institutional obstacles. 
 The vision developed in the Security Strategy could be interpreted as a 
confirmation of Spain’s contribution to – but also learning from – an emerging common 
European vision of security. Within this context, the country’s relationship to the 
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European Union occupies an important position. The Security Strategy makes it clear 
that Spain’s security interests are better accomplished within a reinforced EU presence 
in the world. It also adds that a ‘vigorous’ external action by EU Member States plays a 
part in making the EU presence felt in the world (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 25). 
This reciprocal relationship explains Spain’s dedicated participation in the evolving 
Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), at both the institutional and operational 
levels. It also explains the explicit allusion in the Security Strategy to the 2003 
European Security Strategy and the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy (in addition to 
NATO’s Strategic Concept) as reference points in Spain’s security vision (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2011).2 Notwithstanding the role that external influences have played 
– to use Narcís Serra’s terminology (2010: 68–69) – this chapter will argue that from a 
human security point of view the evolution of Spain's security policy, and its persistent 
limitations, cannot be explained solely by its relation to Europe. The domestic process 
of democratization and modernization, driven by an impetus to end the country’s 
international isolationism, and to eradicate the militaristic culture associated with the 
fascist regime, cannot and should not be forgotten. Indeed, the Security Strategy 
includes the lessons from the country’s democratic transition (which includes the reform 
of the military forces) as one of its defining characteristics as a security actor (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2011: 23). 
 The chapter is divided into five sections. The first two provide an overview of 
the evolution of discourses and capabilities within Spain’s security thinking.3 This is 
followed by an analysis of how the evolving security vision has translated into 
cooperation within the EU and NATO, and the UN. The last section analyses the 
Spanish contribution to peace missions. Throughout the chapter the focus will be on 
those elements that do conform to human security principles and those obstacles that 
have precluded a full endorsement of a ‘human security operating framework’ (HSSG 
2007: 7). 
The Spanish security strategy: discourses 
The determination to develop a security strategy was mentioned by former Prime 
Minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero in the swearing-in speech for his second term in 
office, following the 2008 electoral victory, as well as by other Cabinet ministers in 
appearances later that same year in front of the Parliamentary Defence Affairs 
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Commission (Arteaga 2008). There seems to have been a strong consensus – in policy 
and academic circles – over the fact that the country needed a security strategy that, in 
accordance with the security visions of its main allies and the multilateral organizations 
to which it belongs, would outline goals, threats and vulnerabilities, areas in need of 
action and clear decision-making structures. The resulting systematic approach to 
security, in consultation with Parliament and society, would ensure a comprehensive, 
coherent and effective security vision (Ministry of Defence 2008: 1–2; Arteaga 2008; 
Edwards 2008). 
 The 2011 Spanish Security Strategy is based on a set of principles and values 
that include the respect for democratic values, human rights and the rule of law, and the 
protection of peace, freedom, tolerance, solidarity and global development. These 
principles underpin the protection of Spain’s ‘vital interests’, which at the individual 
level include the right to life, freedom, democracy, welfare and development, and at the 
state level the protection of sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity, the 
constitutional order and economic security (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 16). The 
Security Strategy does not refer explicitly to the idea of human security, but this concept 
is nevertheless very present in the document. Key elements in A Human Security 
Doctrine for Europe (HSSG 2004), such as the protection of civilians, the 
‘responsibility to protect’ and the use (or the threat of use) of proportional force as a last 
resort are included in so far as Spain’s pursuit of its principles, values and interests 
could require intervention in contexts far from the national territory. Moreover, the 
Security Strategy is influenced by the language of legitimacy, transparency and 
accountability. Any Spanish action abroad must uphold international law and the 
principles embedded primarily in the UN Charter, respond to the country’s bilateral or 
multilateral obligations and have Parliamentary approval (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 
22–23, 43–45). Parliamentary control, an example of ‘bottom-up accountability’ (HSSG 
2004: 27–28), should be exercised through the prerogative of ‘consultation and prior 
consent’ to the launch of any new mission, as well as through the responsibility of 
government to present in Parliament – at least once a year – an overview or progress 
report of all Spanish deployments abroad. This parliamentary standard – set by the 
Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence – was summarized by former Prime Minister 
Zapatero a couple of weeks before the law was passed as follows: ‘while this 
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government is in office, not a single soldier will leave without the support of 
Parliament’ (quoted in Herranz Surrallés 2008: 24). 
 Zapatero’s emphasis on popular consultation was, in part, a direct response to 
the decision-making procedures followed during the Iraq War by his predecessor, 
former Conservative Prime Minister José María Aznar. The Socialist Party’s position 
was that the Spanish presence in Iraq was not acceptable unless the UN took over 
political and military control of the situation and Iraqi institutions were quickly re-
established (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 56). Spain’s participation in this military 
intervention therefore took place despite a complete breakdown of the political 
consensus over foreign and security policy that had, by and large, characterized the 
country for much of the post-Franco period.4 It also led to widespread popular 
opposition, with 91 per cent of the Spanish population against the presence of Spanish 
troops in Iraq. The Socialist Party’s victory in the March 2004 elections (former Prime 
Minister Zapatero’s first term in office) led to the withdrawal of all Spanish troops from 
Iraqi soil earlier than the agreed 30 June 2004 deadline, something that was not 
welcomed or accepted by the US government, or understood by some European 
partners. However, this withdrawal met the demands of the majority of Spanish citizens 
(Barbé and Mestres 2007: 56). 
 Beyond the Iraqi case, the track record of making Zapatero’s parliamentary 
pledge into a reality is mixed. It has not been applied equally to all missions with 
Spanish military participation. Herranz Surrallés’ research (2008: 25) shows that only 
the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) went through ex ante consultation and 
approval from the Spanish Parliament, whereas the EU military mission to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR RD Congo) and NATO’s International 
Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan (ISAF) were debated after the missions had 
been established and/or the Spanish government had committed to contributing troops 
to those missions. In the case of the NATO Operation Unified Protector in Libya, 
parliamentary consent was sought after the government had committed to participating 
in the mission. Such an approach was justified through the use of Article 17(3) of the 
Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence, whereby when forced to take decisions due 
to the urgency of the situation, the government would nevertheless seek Parliament’s 
ratification of such decision as soon as possible (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37721; 
Revista Española de Defensa 2011: 16–17). However, as noted by Herranz Surrallés in 
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relation to the missions in the Democratic Republic of Congo and Afghanistan, this 
approach effectively curtails the room for parliamentary influence over governmental 
policy. Moreover, the CSDP military operations EUFOR Althea (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina), Amis II (Darfur/Sudan) and EUFOR Tchad/RCA (Chad/Central African 
Republic) did not go through Parliament (Herranz Surrallés 2008: 25, 30). The 
performance is poorer among CSDP civilian missions, given that – as explained by 
Herranz Surrallés (2008: 25–26) – these are not covered by the Organic Law 5/2005 on 
National Defence, which introduced the internal legitimacy/accountability clause. Her 
research therefore shows that in the 2004–2008 period none of the CSDP civilian 
missions with Spanish participation (Guardia Civil and/or National Police) went 
through parliamentary debate. In this regard, it has been noted by some commentators 
that the Security Strategy – launched in an almost pre-electoral campaign period – has 
so far lacked the support of all the main political forces in the country, which could 
erode its claim to legitimately represent the values and needs of the Spanish society and 
could turn it into a ‘paper tiger’ with no real application. The Conservative party 
(People’s Party or Partido Popular) – the main opposition party until it won the 
November 2011 legislative elections - has in the past indicated that it does not support 
the Security Strategy partly because it was not debated in Parliament prior to its 
publication (Núñez Villaverde 2011; Argumosa 2011; Villarejo 2011; Mestres 2011: 5). 
 The gap between discourse and practice over the role of Parliament typifies a 
much wider discrepancy in the evolution of Spain’s security thinking. A closer look at 
the Security Strategy leads to a more conservative interpretation of the influence that the 
human security discourse has had on Spain’s security vision. One cannot deny that 
Spain has moved substantially away from the discourse that dominated the debate 
during and immediately after the end of the Franco period – a discourse that focused on 
the territorial defence against Spain’s enemies (i.e. Morocco in relation to Ceuta and 
Melilla, and the control of the Straits of Gibraltar). At the same time, one can still today 
observe an ambivalent position towards a complete abandonment of core notions within 
a national security approach. The Security Strategy’s opening section begins with the 
following statement: ‘Guaranteeing the security of Spain and of its inhabitants and 
citizens is the responsibility of the Government …’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 9). 
Moreover, the list of Spain’s ‘vital interests’ does include – as previously mentioned – 
the individual right to life, freedom, democracy and so on, but the Security Strategy 
This is the accepted pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in National, European and Human 
Security: From Coexistence to Convergence, edited by M. Martin, M. Kaldor and N. Serra, Routledge, 2013.  
 
If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the correct pagination.  
 
6 
 
refers to these as the fundamental rights of the Spanish people (Prime Minister’s Office 
2011: 16). For Estella, Torres and Cebada (2010: 28, 34–35), Spain’s contribution to 
international security is therefore motivated by self-interest rather that solidarity, given 
the increasing transnational nature of many threats and the limited capacity of individual 
states to protect themselves and their citizens. Moreover, as mentioned above, Spain’s 
vital interests also include sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence, with 
Gibraltar described as an ‘anomaly’ that poses security problems both for Spain and 
Europe. No further details are provided on what these security problems are but, going 
back to the 2003 Strategic Defence Review, these could potentially include the 
curtailment of Spain’s sovereignty. The scenario included in the 2003 document is the 
possibility of using Gibraltar to launch operations in geographical areas of strategic 
importance to Spain (such as the access to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic), but 
without needing Spanish participation (Ministry of Defence 2003: 50). The Security 
Strategy also talks of the use of the national airspace to protect the country from 
terrorists, but also attacks from other states using airplanes, ballistic or cruise missiles 
(carrying, potentially, weapons of mass destruction) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 26, 
42). This point was also made in the 2003 Strategic Defence Review wherein it was 
admitted that a large-scale armed aggression against the Spanish territory or its maritime 
or air space was highly unlikely. However, according to this document the threat of 
terrorism or missile attack still required attention (Ministry of Defence 2003: 49). 
 This residual adherence to the idea of territorial defence is present in key 
security and defence documents that have preceded the Security Strategy. The 2008 
National Defence Directive uses a very similar language when making the point that 
‘Spain considers its sovereignty, territorial integrity and constitutional order as essential 
interests’ (Ministry of Defence 2008: 6). Similarly, Article 2 of the Organic Law 5/2005 
on National Defence provides for a broader understanding of the relationship between 
security and defence as a means to protect, among other things, the independence and 
territorial integrity of the country (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37718). 
 This ‘cohabitation’ of national and human security discourses is most evident in 
the Security Strategy’s passages on the armed forces. Significant steps have been 
accomplished in the modernization and democratization of the armed forces – a theme 
intrinsic to Spain’s ‘military transition’ away from the Franco regime – in line with the 
need for flexible, interoperable, deployable and multifunctional troops (Prime 
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Minister’s Office 2011: 46).5 From a human security point of view, one should note the 
emphasis placed on the promotion of gender equality and awareness in training 
programmes; the sustainability of troop numbers; the depoliticization of the armed 
forces to ensure they serve the needs of the people rather than those of the state; and the 
introduction of mechanisms to enable armed personnel to readjust to civilian life and to 
prepare civilians for support roles within the armed forces (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 52; 
Serra 2010: Chs 5–6). Moreover, since 2003, debates on the use of the armed forces 
have included two types of missions: multilateral missions (namely of a peace-support 
and humanitarian nature) and missions to support Spain’s governmental authorities in 
ensuring the security and well-being of Spanish citizens (Ministry of Defence 2003: 58–
62).6 The latter category of missions includes the evacuation of Spanish nationals 
resident abroad in situations where internal turmoil in the country where they reside 
endangers their lives and interests. It also covers civil emergency situations caused by 
natural disasters or human action, such as flood relief interventions, soil 
decontamination, border controls and the protection of communication lines within the 
national territory from terrorist attacks. Other possible tasks are the use of the armed 
forces to enforce environmental laws against ships carrying hazardous or contaminating 
materials, to deploy on firefighting missions within the national territory or to provide 
security when major international events are taking place on Spanish soil, such as the 
meetings of the European Council in Barcelona and Seville (March and June 2002 
respectively). 
 At the same time, security debates in Spain have not been able to disassociate 
completely from traditional understandings of the role of armed forces. That is, that the 
armed forces have – in line with the Spanish constitution – a mandate to guarantee the 
sovereignty and independence of Spain, as well as its territorial integrity and 
constitutional order. The 2008 National Defence Directive stated: ‘in the national 
sphere, the armed forces must maintain a deterrent and response capacity that is 
sufficient to defend Spain’ (Ministry of Defence 2008: 6). The same message is 
conveyed by the 2011 Security Strategy when it mentions that the armed forces must 
retain a defence capacity in case the Spanish territory (including the two Autonomous 
Cities of Ceuta and Melilla) and its people come under direct attack. Spain is presented 
as vulnerable due to its geographical situation and history (Prime Minister’s Office 
2011: 44). 
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 The Security Strategy defines Spain’s values and vital interests in relation to a 
range of national, regional and global threats. These threats stem from armed conflict, 
terrorism, weak states and/or unstable regions, organized crime, economic/financial 
insecurity, energy insecurity, weapons of mass destruction, cyber-threats, uncontrolled 
migratory movements, and environmental crises. These threats can be accentuated by a 
range of trends and processes, including globalization, demographic growth, poverty 
and inequality in certain regions of the world and even within Europe, climate change, 
ideological and religious extremism, and technological advancements.7 These threats 
and exacerbating factors can have defence-related, but also political, economic and 
social repercussions for Spain and its partners in multilateral frameworks, endangering 
the stability of national, regional and global systems (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: Chs 
3–4). 
 It is clear from the above that – as explained by Núñez Villaverde (2011) – 
Spain has endorsed an understanding of security that no longer distinguishes between 
the internal and external dimensions. In this sense, it follows the trend that has 
permeated key EU documents in recent years, including the 2003 European Security 
Strategy and the 2010 EU Internal Security Strategy (Ioannides and Collantes-Celador 
2011: 420–422; Núñez Villaverde 2011). As mentioned above, both of these EU 
documents are included in the Security Strategy as reference points in Spain’s security 
evolution. This is not the first time that synergies are found between the Spanish and 
European security discourses. Mestres’ comparison of former Prime Minister Zapatero’s 
June 2008 speech at the Museo del Padro (Madrid) with the 2008 Report on the 
Implementation of the European Security Strategy shows one crucial common factor: 
both refer to the need to use the concept of human security to find a suitable approach to 
security matters (Mestres 2011: 4). Moreover, the 2008 National Defence Directive – 
another key document in the evolution of Spanish security thinking – has much in 
common, in terms of the threats enumerated (and even the manner these are presented8), 
with the 2003 European Security Strategy and the 2008 Implementation Report 
(Council of the European Union 2003, 2008). The 2008 National Defence Directive 
understands security as a basic right, as a fundamental public good for citizens, but also 
as a societal requirement in relation to many of the same challenges outlined in the 
abovementioned EU documents; i.e. international terrorism, organized crime, weapons 
of mass destruction, weak or failed states and regional conflicts (due to their capacity to 
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generate humanitarian crises and affect energy supplies for third states), resource wars, 
climate change and cyberspace threats (Ministry of Defence 2008: 3–4). The 2011 
Security Strategy continues this trend, showing great similarities with the threats 
identified in these key EU documents, but also in the security strategies of, among other 
countries, the United States, the United Kingdom and NATO (IEEE 2011). 
The Spanish security strategy: capabilities 
In order to meet adequately the threats and risk factors facing Spain, the Security 
Strategy emphasizes the need for responsible and effective governance at the 
international and regional levels, enhanced international legal tools and further 
European integration. At the national level, the 2011 document also points to a greater 
use of a number of state and societal actors, and improved capabilities in the areas of 
diplomacy, security and civil protection forces, intelligence services and international 
cooperation/development. This latter point is one of the most innovative aspects of the 
Security Strategy. According to the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, security 
policy can have a strengthening role on the social cohesion of a polity by making 
society an actor – rather that the state alone – in the provision of well-being (IEEE 
2010a). It is too soon to determine the impact that the Security Strategy will have within 
Spain, but what is clear is that it represents an important step forward in the manner 
security and defence policies are discussed and decided upon. 
 The Security Strategy consolidates, but also goes beyond, the ‘whole of 
government’ approach that was introduced by the 2008 National Defence Directive. The 
latter document broke away from the compartmentalized approach followed for much of 
the post-Franco period, when strategic considerations were dominated by those 
ministries that were most actively involved in this domain, such as the Ministry of 
Defence (IEEE 2011: 1; Arteaga 2008: 6–7). This directive conceived of defence policy 
as a state policy under the leadership of the Prime Minister, requiring an integrated, 
inter-ministerial and multidisciplinary approach for its design and execution. The 
expectation – as explicitly mentioned in that directive – was that future defence 
strategies would be framed within a security strategy (Ministry of Defence 2008: 1–2). 
The formulation of the 2008 directive was the result of a team effort by all departments 
in the public administration with any role in defence and security matters. Thus, the 
ministries of the Interior, Foreign Affairs and Treasury had an active role in its design, 
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as did senior members of the armed forces, the Prime Minister and the Director of the 
National Intelligence Services (Centro Nacional de Inteligencia). The 2011 Security 
Strategy goes beyond the 2008 directive by incorporating into the process the regional 
public administrative structures (Autonomous Communities or Comunidades 
Autónomas). More importantly, it provides the Prime Minister’s Office with greater 
leadership, executive and coordination roles through the so-called Spanish Security 
Council (Consejo Español de Seguridad). Already described as ‘supraministerial 
integration’ (Arteaga 2011), this newly formed Council enjoys powers in the areas of 
decision-making, advising, monitoring and crisis management, going beyond what 
previous coordinating bodies had at their disposal. Moreover, its membership is flexible, 
incorporating into the process governmental actors depending on the nature of the threat 
or issue under discussion (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 83). The work of the Spanish 
Security Council is complemented by two other structures that perform a wide range of 
activities related to the Security Strategy and have a multidisciplinary membership. 
These are the Interministerial Committees (Comisiones Interministeriales) and the 
Support Unit (Unidad de Apoyo). 
 This expanded and flexible ‘whole of government’ approach is combined in the 
Security Strategy with greater use of the private (business) sector, societal 
organizations, educational institutions (e.g. university research groups) and the 
citizenry. One is therefore witnessing what Estella, Torres and Cebada (2010: 50) would 
argue is the process of moving from a ‘whole of government’ to a ‘whole of state’ 
approach to security. The technological know-how, the international presence and the 
economic and human resources at the disposal of the private sector receive particular 
attention, both when describing their potential security role in protecting vessels from 
piracy, but also infrastructures, power grids and other essential services from cyber- and 
terrorist attacks. Equally, the Security Strategy advocates a ‘culture of prevention and 
rationalization’ (i.e. not spending less, but spending better) in order to develop a 
responsible and efficient use of resources; this is in part a response to Spain’s precarious 
economic situation following the global financial crisis. The collaboration of all sectors 
in society, from the central state machinery to citizens, is crucial to the development of 
such a culture. And, last but not least, in line with the commitment to popular legitimacy 
in security policy, the Security Strategy mentions the role of societal actors when 
developing adequate national policies in domains such as migration (including 
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approaches to the social integration of migrants) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 9–17, 
56, 72). 
 The incorporation of societal actors into Spain’s security policy has already 
begun. Relevant ministries and other state structures, and political parties, were 
involved in the elaboration of the Security Strategy. This approach was complemented 
by an open consultation process (in the form of three workshops held in Madrid and 
Barcelona in 2010) with the private sector (banks and businesses), think tanks, NGOs in 
the humanitarian, conflict and international aid fields, journalists, academics and other 
experts from abroad.9 Moreover, the Security Strategy calls for the creation of a number 
of operational structures to enhance Spain’s security responses, including a Social 
Forum (Foro Social). This structure should act as a consultative mechanism in support 
of the Spanish Security Council and will be composed of all the societal actors 
mentioned above in addition to the regional public administrative structures (Prime 
Minister’s Office 2011: 84–85). However, the Security Strategy acknowledges that 
society’s contribution depends on the development of a security culture as opposed to 
the defence culture that dominated much of the post-Franco period. This development 
would involve educating citizens, professionals and security actors (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2011: 18). At a time of economic precariousness, and with an enduring history of 
little societal intervention and collaboration in state matters of a defence and security 
nature, it is unclear how this culture of security can take root (see, for example, the 
views of Núñez Villaverde 2011). 
 The need for enhanced national preparedness also translates – in the Security 
Strategy – into a commitment to introduce measures that will improve existing 
diplomatic, military, police and international aid tools. An important motivating factor 
is the need to develop the relationship between (national) civilian and military actors 
and, thus, Spain’s potential as a civilian power in the international system – an 
argumentative line also explored in the 2008 National Defence Directive. Legislative 
and institutional reforms have already provided for formal and informal channels of 
coordination between the ministries of Foreign Affairs, Defence, Treasury, Interior and 
the Intelligence Services (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 57; Arteaga 2008: 6–7). However, 
there is ample room for improvement in tandem with the pledges on civil–military 
cooperation included in the 2011 Security Strategy. Spain’s participation in peace 
missions has, by and large, been dominated by the contribution of troops. As noted by 
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Mestres (2011: 5), the emphasis on ‘Spain’s military ambitions’ during Zapatero’s 
governments has come at the expense of developing civilian capabilities, a gap that the 
previous Conservative government also failed to address. However, the Spanish armed 
forces are beginning to accept mixed missions with civilian actors, something that was 
gradually becoming an inevitability given the many development and humanitarian 
activities they have been called to fulfil in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Lebanon, 
Afghanistan and Haiti (2010 earthquake), among others places.10 A large component of 
Spanish civilian deployments to peace missions has come in the form of Guardia Civil 
(gendarmerie-type forces) as opposed to civilian police forces (Estella et al. 2010: 45). 
As part of her research into the Spanish contribution to CSDP civilian missions, Sabiote 
(2008: 81, footnote 34) found a competitive, rather than cooperative, relationship 
between Guardia Civil and the National Police Corps (Cuerpo Nacional de Policía) that 
affected decisions on the nature of contingents to send on international missions. 
Against this background, the Security Strategy’s call for the creation of an External 
Integrated Response Unit (Unidad de Respuesta Integrada Exterior) is to be welcomed. 
This unit is meant to work as an inter-ministerial body with the role of coordinating 
swift responses to multilateral or national interventions abroad that require the armed 
forces, but also civilian elements, including judges, police, doctors, firemen, engineers 
and other experts in a variety of fields such as logistics, prisons, gender and customs 
(Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 48).11 
 If successful, enhanced civil–military capabilities and cooperation would allow 
Spain to provide the comprehensive approach it advocates in its Security Strategy, 
bringing it closer to a human security approach to the prevention, management and 
resolution of conflicts. It could also help attenuate the impact of the economic 
difficulties currently facing the country, by using civilian actors where defence budgets 
can no longer provide due to cutbacks.12 The defence budget (as a share of the national 
non-financial expenditure budget) has gone from 5.23 per cent in 2009 to 4.16 per cent 
in 2010. The year 2011 witnessed a slight increase of the defence share to 4.77 per cent. 
This was due to a larger drop in the overall volume of the 2011 national non-financial 
expenditure budget (18.9 per cent reduction from 2010) compared with the drop in the 
defence share of that budget (7 per cent reduction from 2010). As explained in 
Parliament by the Secretary of State for Defence, the 7 per cent reduction in the defence 
share is in real terms only a 3.66 per cent drop due to the fact that throughout 2010 the 
This is the accepted pre-publication version of a book chapter that appears in National, European and Human 
Security: From Coexistence to Convergence, edited by M. Martin, M. Kaldor and N. Serra, Routledge, 2013.  
 
If you wish to cite it please consult the final published version for the correct pagination.  
 
13 
 
resources initially earmarked for defence matters were gradually cut down in line with 
the government’s austerity measures. Even then, the data indicates that the additional 
reduction in 2011 comes at a significant price in terms of the resources normally 
devoted to military personnel costs (Spanish Parliament 2010b: 2, 5; Ministry of 
Defence 2011: 8). At the time of writing and following the November 2011 legislative 
elections won by the conservative People’s Party (under the leadership of Mariano 
Rajoy), the country is preparing for a new round of austerity measures. Against this 
background it will be challenging for the Security Strategy to harness the sustained 
attention it needs to have a real impact on security practices. 
Spain and European security organizations 
The Security Strategy reiterates that, without abandoning its bilateral commitments, 
Spain adheres to the goals of ‘effective multilateralism’ and ‘responsible 
interdependence’ in the pursuit of functioning structures of global governance that cater 
for the increasingly transnational threats the country faces nationally, regionally and 
internationally (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). This is an area where Spain has already 
provided ample evidence of its efforts to translate words into deeds, albeit with some 
limitations, as highlighted in the rest of this chapter. Spain is an active participant in a 
variety of multilateral security forums, with an increasing emphasis on European 
regional organizations (namely the EU and NATO), but always in accordance with its 
obligations as a member of the United Nations. The origins of this commitment are to 
be found in the modernization and democratization processes that followed the end of 
the Franco regime. Integration into Western European institutions became crucial to 
break away from two main facets of the Franco period. First, was the isolationism from 
the European continent that resulted from the regime’s ideological and political 
disagreements with the rest of Europe and its different strategic priorities. Whereas 
Franco was interested in the south (i.e. Morocco and Gibraltar), most of Spain’s 
European neighbours focused on the threats emanating from the Soviet Union. Second, 
was the military status quo that permeated all aspects of Spanish society during the 
fascist regime. This military status quo responded to the conviction that the prime role 
of the military establishment was the protection of internal order and patriotic values 
from the threat of communism, not national defence (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 50; Serra 
2010: 93–99). 
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 Spain’s integration into Western European security organizations went through a 
number of phases, best exemplified in its relations with NATO, culminating in a 
situation where now the security of Spain is intrinsically and indissolubly linked to that 
of Europe (Ministry of Defence 2008: 5). This has translated into a strong adherence to 
the full development of the EU’s ‘actorness’ in the international system, particularly in 
the security and defence fields. At the same time, this commitment to the EU has not 
diminished Spain’s interest in contributing to the ‘transatlantic space’ through NATO. 
The 2011 Security Strategy refers to NATO as the ‘main intergovernmental defence 
alliance’ and as ‘central to the security of the [European] region’ (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2011: 31). It is therefore not surprising to find that since the late 1990s (when it 
joined NATO’s command structures) Spain has actively participated in a number of the 
Alliance’s structures and operations. 
 The 2011 Security Strategy argues that while Spain would benefit from a 
strengthened EU on the world scene, it must contribute actively to this strengthening 
process (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 24–25). This reciprocal relationship explains the 
country’s active involvement in EU actions against piracy in Somalia and in the fight 
against illegal migration. In both instances Spain has contributed actively to the creation 
and development of structures (i.e. the Military Coordination of Action against Piracy in 
Somalia (NAVCO) and the European Agency for the Management of Operational 
Cooperation at the External Borders of the Member States of the European Union 
(FRONTEX) and missions (the military operation EU NAVFOR Somalia ‘Atalanta’ 
against piracy in the Somali coast, the military mission to train Somali security forces 
(EUTM-Somalia). In both cases there was a clear awareness that the security 
repercussions at the national level arising from piracy and migration could not be 
addressed without greater activity at the EU level (Prime Minister’s Office 2011; 
Mestres 2011: 4). At the same time, this cooperation also has its limits. In the area of 
border management, Spain is committed to the free movement of people within the 
Union, but is not ready to relinquish all its sovereign powers. This explains its 
opposition in 2011, together with Germany and France, to the European Commission’s 
proposal to reinforce its own powers vis-à-vis national prerogatives within the Schengen 
Treaty. The Commission's proposal was, at least in part, motivated by the ‘diplomatic 
incident’ on the French–Italian border in April 2011. For a short time, France closed its 
border with the south of Italy when faced with an increasing volume of refugees who 
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were fleeing the violence in Tunisia (but also Libya). This move was followed by a 
French–Italian initiative within the EU to reintroduce the capacity of Schengen Member 
States to impose temporary border controls when faced with similar situations in the 
future. Denmark further complicated the situation in May 2011 when it unilaterally 
decided to reinstall permanent border controls with Germany and Sweden as a means to 
fight cross-border criminality (La Vanguardia 2011a, 2011b). 
 This reciprocal relationship with Europe is also behind Spain’s conviction that 
the EU needs a ‘true defence policy with adequate and credible [defence] means’ in 
addition to other political instruments, such as the European External Action Service 
(Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 25). Further defence integration at the EU level is 
Spain’s response to the cuts in defence budgets at the national level – again, the idea is 
not spending less, but spending better by joining forces with EU Member States. 
Spain’s Presidency of the Council of the EU (January to June 2010) included in its 
agenda the refinement of the Battlegroup concept as a means to enhance military 
cooperation among EU Member States, including during humanitarian crises (Spanish 
Presidency of the European Union 2011: 5–6). In this regard it is noteworthy that Spain 
is among the five countries (together with France, Italy, Germany and Poland) that in 
September 2011 urged Baroness Catherine Ashton, High Representative of the Union 
for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, to sponsor the creation of a permanent 
command centre for the planning and development of missions, as permitted by the 
notion of ‘permanent structured cooperation’ under the Treaty of Lisbon (El Mundo 
2011). 
 Notwithstanding its commitment, the contribution Spain can make to further 
defence integration at the EU level is at least in part questionable due to the limitations 
imposed by its funding mechanisms and its military power. In the past, as noted by 
Barbé and Mestres (2007: 59–60) and even when Spanish defence budgets were 
growing (up to 2007), Spain encountered difficulties with the costs of unforeseen 
missions that operated under the principle of ‘costs lie where they fall’ (such as 
NATO’s relief operation during the earthquake in Pakistan). Sabiote (2008: 77) adds 
strength to these arguments by showing how Spain’s insistence – during Zapatero’s first 
administration (2004–2008) – on a model of Battlegroups that favoured contributions by 
a small number of countries (or tactical groupings) responded to national exigencies; in 
particular, the small size of the Spanish military compared with that of many European 
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partners, both in terms of defence budgets and its initial absence from the European 
defence equipment market. 
Spain and the United Nations 
Despite the importance Spain increasingly places on its role within European security 
organizations, it has not abandoned its deep-rooted commitment to the United Nations. 
The Security Strategy states that the UN is ‘the essential source of legitimacy for 
international actions and the most relevant forum for world co-peration; its role is 
fundamental to the maintenance of international peace and security’ (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2011: 31). A number of decisions and actions have been taken in the last few 
years that clearly illustrate Spain’s commitment to the UN system in line with a human 
security discourse. These include its pledge to commit 0.7 per cent of its GDP by 2015 
to Official Development Assistance (ODA).13 There has also been a steady increase in 
Spanish contributions to the UN Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF), reaching 
US$39.6 million (€29 million, approximately) in 2010, and thereby making Spain the 
fifth largest donor (after Norway, Sweden, UK and Netherlands) (CERF 2010).14 It is 
also fully committed to the reform of the UN Security Council, advocating an increase 
in the number, length of term and participatory role for non-permanent members and 
restricted use of the veto powers. These proposals are motivated by Spain’s 
commitment to make this key decision-making organ more representative and 
legitimate. It also supports a number of measures in the realm of international justice 
and human rights, including the consolidation of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and the work of the Human Rights Council, of which it is a member for the 2010–2013 
period (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2007b; Estella et al. 2010: 51–52; IEEE 
2010b: 24).15 It is within this commitment to human rights and international justice that 
one can find one of Spain’s most important achievements within the UN system: the 
promotion of women’s rights, particularly during armed conflict. It is therefore 
surprising that the 2011 Security Strategy does not develop this aspect of Spain’s 
international role, only mentioning three times, and rather succinctly, the words 
‘gender’ and/or ‘women’ (Prime Minister’s Office 2011: 14, 15, 43). 
 The November 2010 invitation to become a member of the governing structures 
of UN-Women marks the culmination of Spain’s sustained work over the years on 
gender issues (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2010).16 Notable past actions 
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include its leading donor status in the UN Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM) 
during the 2004–2007 period. In 2008 it also provided UNIFEM with €50 million to 
launch the new Fund for Gender Equality. The Fund’s mandate is to assist multi-donor 
projects by governments and civil society organizations in developing countries 
working on the promotion of women’s political and economic empowerment at the local 
and national levels (UNIFEM 2007: 25, para. 8; 2008). Moreover, since 2007, Spain has 
incorporated Resolution 1325 to its contributions to peace missions and to its activities 
in the field of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR). The aim is to 
guarantee the rights of women, adolescents and girls in conflict and post-conflict zones 
and incorporate them into peace negotiation and implementation processes, 
collaborating with Spanish civil society in the attainment of these goals (Spanish 
Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c). On this basis, and as part of the Spanish 
Presidency of the Council of the EU (January–June 2010), a seminar was organized in 
Madrid to advocate for the introduction of measures that would ensure the gender 
dimension is adequately incorporated into CSDP missions. Among the suggested 
measures was a proposal to make recommendations to EU Member States on how best 
to follow Resolution 1325 within their national defence and security policies (Ministry 
of Defence 2010). 
 At the national level, this commitment to Resolution 1325 has led, for example, 
to efforts to fully integrate women in the armed forces with the same opportunities and 
welfare benefits as men, including provisions to better balance family and work. This 
clear commitment is further exemplified by the creation in 2005, within the Ministry of 
Defence, of an Observatory of Women in the Armed Forces (Observatorio de la Mujer 
en las Fuerzas Armadas) to monitor selection and promotion processes and the overall 
well-being of women. By mid-2009 over 12 per cent of the armed forces and 9.5 per 
cent of Spanish personnel in peace missions were women. These improvements have 
addressed some of the long-standing gaps with respect to women’s involvement in the 
Spanish armed forces, although there is still room for improvement when it comes to the 
presence of women in the higher military ranks (Ministry of Foreign Affairs 2010: 5–9; 
Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN 2007c). 
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Spain and peace missions 
Spain has participated for over 22 years in peace missions, with the first contribution 
taking place in 1988 when it was invited by the UN to join the UN Angola Verification 
Mission I (UNAVEM-I), a mission deployed to verify the withdrawal of Cuban troops 
from Angola. The first Spanish participation in a multinational military operation came 
during the 1991 Gulf War when Spain allowed US forces en route to the Gulf region 
limited use of military facilities in its territory. It also sent naval units to the region as 
part of the Western European Union’s (WEU) enforcement of the UN embargo (Mestres 
2011: 2). Since then Spain has been involved in over 50 missions, in some of them 
taking leading positions and with an increasing preference, some would argue, for 
NATO and EU operations. This commitment over the years has required a growing 
deployment of Spanish personnel abroad, a figure that stood at 120,000 troops by the 
end of 2010 (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 2). 
 Spain’s adherence to effective multilateralism through participation in peace 
missions has nevertheless been challenged by the very dangerous nature of some of the 
interventions. The decision in February 2006 (during former Prime Minister Zapatero’s 
first term in office) to withdraw the 200-strong Spanish military contingent from the UN 
Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) came with a 45-day notice as opposed to 
the standard nine months’ to a year’s notice (in this regard, for political reasons, Iraq is 
another example of a similar governmental position). Although the reasons that led the 
Ministry of Defence to take this decision do not seem to be officially known, one of the 
plausible explanations could be the need to ensure that the Spanish budget was not 
stretched too thinly by contributing to too many missions simultaneously.17 However, 
Aguirre Ernst (2006: 4) mentions an alternative explanation for the Spanish withdrawal 
from Haiti: the need to avoid casualties that could be used by the political opposition for 
electionering purposes. Equally, Sabiote argues that Spain’s half-hearted contribution to 
the EU mission EUFOR Tchad/RCA could be explained by the risk levels it faced in a 
preceding EU military mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo (EUFOR DR 
Congo), where it was among the nations that made the largest contributionss (Sabiote 
2008: 77–78).18  
 Whether Spain is becoming more risk-sensitive remains the subject for ongoing 
debate, particularly surrounding current military deployments, of which the Spanish 
contingent in NATO’s ISAF is, at the time of writing, the largest. In the presentation to 
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the Spanish Parliament in December 2010, former Minister of Defence Chacón 
prioritized the provision of the highest level of protection to Spanish troops deployed in 
missions abroad, particularly those in Afghanistan (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 11–12). 
 Spain’s adherence to effective multilateralism has also been put to the test in 
Kosovo, but for different reasons. Spain’s non-recognition of the unilateral declaration 
of independence by the Kosovo authorities seems to have been heavily influenced by a 
domestic (political) debate on the governance of the Spanish territory and relations 
between the state and the regions. Domestic politics have, therefore, been prioritized 
over the country’s commitments to its strategic partners in the EU and NATO (see, for 
example, the analysis by Torreblanca 2009; Johansson-Nogués 2008). Indeed, a range 
of actions taken by the Spanish government have been criticized by its allies. Examples 
include the 2008 decision to vote in the UN in favour of having the International Court 
of Justice look into the legality of Kosovo’s declaration of independence, against the 
views of NATO and EU allies, and the 2009 decision to gradually withdraw all Spanish 
troops serving under the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). In fact, at the time of writing, 
Spain only has one military observer with the UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), as well 
as 13 Guardia Civil officers (out of a total of 1,200 international police) in the EU Rule 
of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX) (Spanish Parliament 2010a: 32; Ioannides & 
Collantes-Celador 2011: 433; Torreblanca 2009; Estella et al. 2010: 45). 
Conclusion 
The 2011 Security Strategy confirms the remarkable transition that the country has 
experienced in its security thinking. It strengthens Spain’s move to endorse a much 
broader understanding of its shared security threats and obligations in a globalized 
world. More than 22 years of contributing to peace missions and other humanitarian and 
development actions have left a deep mark in the Spanish security thinking. The result 
has been a set of priorities and areas of action that include the protection of civilians, 
gender issues, the reinforcement of international legal instruments and the development 
of the EU ‘actorness’ as a way to realize its commitment to effective multilateralism. 
The emphasis – at least in theory – on domestic democratic control or bottom-up 
accountability (through Parliament) and the international legality of missions (through 
UN authorization) is at the top of the list of requirements Spain increasingly demands 
before its troops are deployed abroad. 
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 Notwithstanding all the progress attained since the end of the Franco period, it is 
nevertheless debatable to what extent this endorsement of a wider understanding of 
security – that shares much with a human security approach – amounts to a 
paradigmatic shift in its security vision. Human security precepts continue to co-exist 
with a residual attachment to defence defined in territorial terms, not only when setting 
goals, but also when outlining the role of the Spanish armed forces. The growing 
concern with the security of Spanish personnel deployed in peace missions, and 
decisions taken on mission deployments on the basis of domestic imperatives, are in 
direct confrontation with key human security elements, such as the goal of ensuring the 
well-being of citizens during armed conflict or responding to the needs on the ground 
(HSSG 2004: 14–15). It also calls into question Spain’s commitment to effective 
multilateralism, not only within European security organizations, but also in the UN 
system. 
 The credibility of this evolving human security discourse and its embodiment in 
the form of the 2011 Security Strategy could be further called into question by the 
current financial situation in the country and the lack of support from all political forces. 
Both elements are essential if Spain is to have the time and resources to translate words 
into deeds, particularly in the realm of military, but more importantly civilian, 
capabilities. The 2011 Security Strategy is an important step in the right direction, but 
whether it will succeed where previous attempts could not, or only had limited effect, 
remains an open question. Only time will tell. 
Notes 
1 During the preparation of this chapter the CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for 
International Affairs) Foundation and the Observatory of European Foreign 
Policy (Barcelona) provided invaluable assistance and guidance. The author 
would also like to thank the editors of the book for comments on previous 
versions of the chapter. The translations from Spanish to English are unofficial, 
carried out by the author. As always, any errors and omissions are the author’s 
responsibility alone. 
2 For many, this close relationship to the EU results, at least in part from the 
presence of Javier Solana (former EU High Representative for the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy), who was appointed by the Spanish government in 
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December 2009 to lead the development of the Spanish Security Strategy (see, 
for example, IEEE 2011: 3). 
3 Although this chapter highlights the importance of the Security Strategy, an 
analysis of Spain’s security thinking would be incomplete without references to 
pre-2011 documents and legislation. These include the National Defence 
Directives (Directivas de Defensa Nacional), the Strategic Defence Review 
(Revisión Estratégica de la Defensa  – approved by Parliament in 2003) and the 
Organic Law 5/2005 on National Defence (Ley Orgánica 5/2005 de la Defensa 
Nacional). The National Defence Directives are documents prepared by the 
Ministry of Defence, presented to Parliament and sanctioned by the Head of 
Government every four years (coinciding with the government’s term in office). 
Prior to the 2011 Security Strategy, these directives represented Spain’s 
provision of a ‘security’ vision that it could share with its partners and public at 
home. 
4 The other main exception was the disagreement during the 1980s between the 
main political forces over NATO membership (Barbé and Mestres 2007: 51). 
The author is grateful to Laia Mestres for her comments in relation to this point. 
5 In its determination to improve the interoperability of the armed forces, Spain 
has participated in a range of European initiatives. Examples include the 
European Gendarmerie Force (EUROGENFOR), the European Operational 
Rapid Force (EUROFOR), the European Naval Force (EUROMARFOR), the 
European Air Group (AEG) and the European Amphibious Initiative (EAI). 
Some of these structures were created to be used – if necessary – during NATO, 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and UN missions 
(Moliner González 2008). 
6 These types of missions were subsequently spelt out in Article 15 of the Organic 
Law 5/2005 on National Defence (Ministry of Defence 2005: 37720–37721). 
7 When discussing these threats, the Security Strategy draws at times from 
contemporary events, including the volcano eruption in Iceland in 2010, the 
North Korean and Iranian nuclear programmes, and cyber attacks in Estonia 
(2007), Georgia (2008) and Iran (2010) (Prime Minister’s Office 2011). 
8 In the 2008 Defence Directive the problem of resource wars is presented as one 
that could become prominent in years to come, particularly in relation to water 
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access. The language and timeframes used shared much in common with the 
passages on those same topics in the 2003 European Security Strategy. 
9 Additional details on each of the three workshops are available on the CIDOB 
Foundation’s website. The CIDOB was one of the organizers of the workshops. 
www.cidob.org/es/publicaciones/dossiers_cidob/estrategia_espanola_de_segurid
ad/la_sociedad_civil_y_la_ees [accessed 5 September 2011]. 
10 The author is grateful to Narcís Serra for his comments in relation to this point. 
11 Interestingly, as early as 2006, a seminar on civil–military relations organized by 
the Spanish think tank Toledo International Centre for Peace (CITpax) proposed 
the creation of an inter-ministerial coordinating unit, as well as highlighting the 
security role of the private sector and NGOs. This seminar brought together 
practitioners and scholars from various ministries and think tanks in Spain, as 
well are representatives from Norway, Canada, Germany, the EU and OSCE 
(Garrigues et al. 2006). 
12 The author is grateful to Mary Martin for her comments in relation to this point. 
13 In fact, in terms of Spanish ODA one can observe a growing financial 
contribution to international actions in favour of the Millennium Development 
Goals, particularly in so far as health, poverty and gender equality are 
concerned. Its commitment to meet the 0.7 per cent benchmark by 2012 had at 
the time of writing been extended to 2015, something that could possibly be 
linked to the country’s financial difficulties (UN 2010). 
14 The UN Central Emergency Response Fund is a standby fund created by the UN 
in 2005 to upgrade the Central Emergency Revolving Fund. It includes a grant 
element based on voluntary contributions from governments, private sector 
organizations and individuals in order to provide more effective (timely and 
reliable) humanitarian assistance to those populations affected by armed conflict 
and natural disasters (Spanish Permanent Mission to the UN, 2007a). In 2010 
alone, donor contributions allowed the Fund to respond to humanitarian crises in 
46 countries. 
15 For a more detailed outline of Spain’s contribution to human rights within the 
UN system, see UN 2010. 
16 UN-Women stands for the UN Entity for Gender Equality and the 
Empowerment of Women. It merges and builds on the work of a range of 
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existing structures and initiatives, including the UN Development Fund for 
Women (UNIFEM) and the UN International Research and Training Institute for 
the Advancement of Women (INSTRAW). 
17 The author is grateful to Narcís Serra for his comments in relation to this point. 
18 The EU mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo proved controversial from 
a political point of view as the government did not receive full support from 
Parliament. The left-wing political party Izquierda Unida questioned the 
legitimacy and independence of the Congolese government to organize 
democratic elections against a background of serious political fragmentation in 
the country. This is an example of Spain diverging from human security ideas if 
we take into account that one of the principles advocated by the Human Security 
Study Group is the establishment of a legitimate domestic authority capable of 
upholding human security (HSSG 2004: 15–16; Sabiote 2008: 78). 
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